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Abstract  
 
There is a need to introduce a corporate governance officer to reinforce 
governance norms in the listed companies. The English company secretary has 
been performing such a role and can be transformed into a corporate 
governance officer. Many Asian countries have also adopted the company 
secretary model to improve corporate governance. Yet there is no common 
framework about the role. This article discusses how the English company 
secretary can be transformed into a corporate governance officer and how 
governance synergies can be created if the Asian countries also adopt this model 
and the framework in which such a model operates. This article also discusses 
areas where the law can be clarified and the framework improved to increase the 
powers and accountability of the corporate governance officer. These include the 
independence of the corporate governance officer, the role of the professional 
services firms, and confidentiality protection given to the corporate governance 
officer to increase transnational governance synergies. 
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Introduction  
 
Corporate scandals around the global markets have prompted regulatory 
agencies to re-think the role of governance professionals and their relationship 
with the companies. The emerging markets in Asia, including China, the world’s 
second largest economy, have also recognised that corporate governance 
professionals can not only reinforce regulatory norms to sustain their capital 
markets but also bring value to the companies. There is a need to have a 
corporate governance officer in listed companies to increase the level of 
corporate governance enforcement. In this article, the author will discuss how 
the English company secretary can be transformed into a corporate governance 
officer and how this new role and the proposed way in which it may operate, if 
adopted by other jurisdictions, can also create transnational governance 
synergies.  
 
The company secretary is an English corporate invention and the office has 
continued to this day to enhance transparency and facilitate board 
independence. The removal of the requirement to appoint a company secretary 
to a private company by the Companies Act 2006 creates an opportunity to have 
a sharper focus on this 108-year-old corporate office with increased corporate 
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governance duties.1 This English invention has at first only been exported to 
other common law jurisdictions such as Hong Kong and Singapore. However, 
China, as a civil law country, transplanted such a statutory officer in its company 
structure since 1993. In 2016, Taiwan also introduced a law requiring all listed 
companies to have a company secretary. Despite the legal installation of this 
office, the company secretary’s function as a corporate gatekeeper has not been 
discussed as extensively as that of other gatekeepers such as auditors, 
compliance officers and lawyers,2 either in the UK or at any transnational level 
such as in the EU or OECD.3 The aim of this paper is to explore how a company 
secretary, as a corporate professional and a corporate governance officer,4 can 
perform an oversight function to increase the  quality of governance. 
 
This paper will argue that a company secretary can act as a corporate gatekeeper 
who is in charge of facilitating investor-led corporate governance built on 
transparency and board independence. Independence is an essential quality 
which must be regulated. This role can be fulfilled by professional services firms 
that have been providing corporate gatekeeper services since the advent of 
capital markets. Thus the issue of whether a company secretary should be 
classified as an internal person or an outsider is not important. Since the UK, US, 
and many Asian countries, especially China, have all introduced the office of 
company secretary, some common ground can be identified to create governance 
space5 and synergies. Therefore, at the transnational level, company secretaries 
of multinational companies have the potential to shape new transnational 
governance since they manage increasing numbers of joint law enforcement 
actions. EU and other transnational regulators should not overlook the ability of 
this corporate governance officer to close gaps in governance, by acting as a 
corporate gatekeeper along with regulators and other corporate professionals.  
 
There are four sections to this paper. Section I examines the evolving role of the 
company secretary from a mere servant to a corporate governance officer, and 
how this office, in parallel with other governance professionals such as auditors 
and lawyers, continues to evolve in an investor-led corporate ecosystem where 
transparency and board independence are the main factors for investment 
                                                        
1 CA2006, s 270. Although the background thinking is under the moto of ‘think small first’ to 
reduce red tape for small companies, it has the effect of placing more emphasis on the public 
companies’ governance. See DTI Company Law Reform White Paper (2005), section 4.  
2 In same countries, public regulators also perform a significant role as corporate gatekeeper. In 
this sense, corporate professionals are the private corporate gatekeepers: see David Freeman 
Engstrom ‘Agencies as litigation gatekeepers’ (2013) 123(3) Yale Law Journal 616 and Julia Black 
‘Entrolling actors in regulatory systems: examples from UK financial services regulation’ (2003) 
Public Law 63-91. 
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decisions. Section II considers whether company secretaries should also be 
independent officers equivalent to auditors, lawyers, and compliance officers. 
And if so, how such independence can be regulated to best promote corporate 
values.  Section III discusses how professional services firms who are outsiders 
to the companies can play a role in adding value to the internal governance. Also 
how independence can be maintained in the face of market competition, 
especially for those firms who provide multiple corporate services. It will also 
discuss the rarely explored area of firms’ attributed liability - the way in which a 
company secretary’s liability as an internal corporate officer may be attributable 
to the professional services firms. It will identify any areas that need particular 
legislative attention in order to avoid any confusion in the interpretation of the 
current law. The discussion will also provide a model for other countries. Section 
IV uses multinational companies as a case study to explore the role of the 
company secretary in the transnational context, and how governance synergies 
may result. Finally, conclusions will be drawn.   
 
 
Section I The evolving role of the company secretary  
 
Historical development  
 
How has the role of the company secretary, although an internal corporate 
officer, evolved with investor-led governance? The role is now comparable to 
other corporate professionals in charge of corporate gatekeeping but the 
company secretary was initially an officer of the company who has served an 
important role in the administration and management of the company’s affairs.6 
The role has changed from being a mere servant of the company to become a 
statutory officer who takes on managerial functions such as chief of staff to the 
chairman or adviser to the board. The role of company secretary has a shorter 
history than that of corporate auditor - another corporate gatekeeper. The UK 
did not include the company secretary in the Companies Act 1855 where the 
principle of limited liability was first introduced.7 In Barnnett, Hoares and Co v 
South London Tramways Co,8 immediately after the principle of limited liability 
was introduced in that Act, Lord Esher M.R. said ‘A secretary is a mere servant; 
his position is that he is to do what he is told, and no person can assume that he 
has any authority to represent anything at all…’. While Lord Esher was dealing 
with an issue of corporate authority, it is important to note that there was no 
legal requirement in 1887 to have a company secretary which is why Lord Esher 
thought that this non-statutory role was a mere servant. The company secretary 
did not receive an official title until the early 1900s when British stock exchanges 
were becoming more international and offered British companies’ shares 
abroad.9 The Companies Act 1908 then required each company to appoint a 
company secretary, while the Companies Act 1929 subsequently prescribed the 
duties and responsibilities of the office. The creation of such a statutory 
corporate officer has eventually led to judicial recognition of the company 
                                                        
6 Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 711 (CA).  
7 Companies Act 1855, s 1.  
8 (1887) 18 Q.E.D. 815 
9 Ranald Michie The London Stock Exchange: A history (OUP Oxford 1998) 70-142. 
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secretary with the authority, usually only conferred on directors, to bind the 
company with third parties.  In Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v Fidelis 
Furnishing Fabrics Ltd, 10 the court recognised the company secretary as an 
officer of the company who had authority to bind the company with third parties. 
In the same case, Salmon LJ described a company secretary as the chief 
administrative officer of the company but left open the question whether he 
would have any authority in relation to the commercial management of the 
company. Since then, the emphasis on the function of the company secretary has 
shifted to legal compliance.  
 
 
Modern function to maintain corporate transparency and board 
independence  
 
Nowadays, capital markets require two critical confidence-building measures for 
financial participation of the investor: transparency11 and board independence.12 
The demand for transparency has led to the development of laws and regulations 
requiring disclosure through filing with various agencies and timely 
announcements through recognised channels.13 Board independence has called 
for increasing numbers of non-executive directors on a board to act as checks 
and balances in corporate administration. The traditional role of the company 
secretary to act as the company’s chief administrative officer for filing 
documents with the Registrar of Companies House continues today. The 
increasing requirement to disclose corporate information through document 
filings and timely announcements has made this administrative office 
indispensable for a company’s operations in a rule-based market economy.14 The 
role of the company secretary in the UK has thus gained greater importance than 
                                                        
10 Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd [1971] 2 QB 711 (CA). 
11 L. Lowenstein ‘Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You 
Measure’ (1996) 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1335, 1361–1362; R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer 
and Robert Vishny, "Legal Determinants of External Finance" (1997) 52 J. Fin. 1131; R. La Porta, 
F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation" 
(2002) 62 J. Fin. 1147. 
12 MJ Jensen & WH Meckling ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and 
ownership structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 305–360; D Higgs Review of the 
role and effectiveness of non- executive directors (2003) London: DTI; KG Corley ‘Examining the 
non-executive director’s role from a non-agency theory perspective: Implications arising from 
the Higgs Report’ (2005) 16 British Journal of Management, 1–4; EU Commission On the role of 
non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the 
(supervisory) board. Commission recommendation, 2005/162/EC; J Gordon ‘The Rise of 
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market 
Prices’ (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review, 1465–1568. 
13 For instance, the Regulatory News Servcie (RNS) of the London Stock Exchange 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/products-and-services/rns/about/rns-remove.htm 
14 The Modern Slavery Act 2015 requires certain larger organisations (wherever incorporated) 
supplying goods or services and carrying on business in the UK to publish a slavery and human 
trafficking statement (‘MSA statement’) each year, describing steps taken (if any) during the 
previous year to ensure that slavery and human trafficking are not occurring in its global supply 
chain. At the EU level, the Directive 2014/95/EU on the disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information (NFR Directive) requires certain large companies to disclose information on policies, 
risks and outcomes as regards environmental matters, social and employee aspects, respect for 
human rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues, and diversity in their board of directors. 
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was originally intended, especially in listed companies which need to comply 
with law and policy to mitigate exposure to legal and reputational risk. This 
increased responsibility was not a result of the direct duties imposed on the 
office by the law, or by providing it with more direct legal powers to be exercised 
against other officers of the company. The driving force for the increased 
importance of the company secretary has been the developments in the law 
requiring greater transparency and more precise governance through internal 
checks and balances. These include splitting the roles of chairman and CEO, 
increased number of non-executive directors and the demand for greater 
corporate social responsibility that is now required by law, and policy 
compliance throughout corporate groups.15  
 
 
The company secretary and board independence 
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code, a soft law operating on the basis of ‘comply 
or explain’, 16 epitomises a de-legalised approach that enhances the role of the 
company secretary in the facilitation of board independence. 17  Since 
independent directors play a constantly increasing role in corporate 
governance,18 through his close involvement with the board by attending board  
and other committee meetings, the company secretary is able to act as an 
interface between the board and shareholder meetings – between, for example, a 
senior independent director and the minority shareholders. In an increasingly 
devolved governance system where independent committees carry out functions 
with the primary aim of removing directors’ conflicts of interest, the company 
secretary can deliver confidence to investors by acting as an interface between 
the committee and the chairman (an independent role). For instance, risks 
identified in committee meetings can be fed to the chairman through the 
company secretary, who normally prepares the committee meetings.19  
 
Services provided by company secretaries can enhance the effectiveness of 
independent directors in the governance system.20 Assisting the non-executive 
chairman in the selection and appointment of non-executive directors and 
providing an induction and training programme to new directors,21 giving advice 
                                                        
15 S Idowu ‘Corporate social responsibility from the perspective of corporate secretaries’ in S 
Idowu and W Filho (eds) Professionals’ perspectives of CSR  (Springer Verlage Berlin Heiderlberg 
2009) 49-70. 
16 UK Corporate Governance Code 2016 (CG Code), 4; However, it is binding on the premium 
listed companies on the London Stock of Exchange.  
17  K Keasey, H Short,  & M Wright ‘The development of corporate governance codes in the UK’ In 
K.  Keasey, S. Thompson, & M. Wright (Eds.), Corporate governance: Accountability, enterprise 
and international comparisons (2005 John Wiley & Sons: Chichester) 21–42; Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Japan all adopt a similar non-statutory code of corporate governance.   
18 Derek Higgs, ‘Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors’  January 2003. 
19 The secretary tends to serve a longer term than the board directors; and can thus offer a 
historical view, in the tradition of the company, to both the board and investors. 
20 Principle A.5.3 of the CG Code states that a company secretary should be ‘responsible to the 
board for ensuring that board procedures are complied with.’ 
21 ICSA Guidance on induction of directors, Guidance Notes June 2012. 
https://www.icsa.org.uk/assets/files/pdfs/guidance/Guidance%20notes%202012/Induction%
20of%20directors.pdf 
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to non-executive directors, and assisting the non-executive chairman in 
conducting board evaluation (a regulatory requirement under the Corporate 
Governance Code for listed companies) brings confidence to the investors, 
especially retail investors.22  These responsibilities may increase investor 
confidence, which reduces the cost of raising capital.23 The reduction of cost of 
capital results in value-creation to companies. 24 These examples show how the 
non-statutory Code can act as a catalyst for providing valuable corporate 
secretarial services to companies that benefit both investors and stakeholders. 
Hong Kong and Singapore have adopted similar codes for listed companies. 25 
Taiwan and China also regulate the company secretary, but not through 
statutory company law. There are more practical reasons for developing such an 
office through non-statutory rules and this will be discussed in later sections of 
this paper.  
 
Focus on listed companies through Codes of Best Practice  
 
While the 2006 Companies Act in the UK removed the requirement for private 
companies to appoint a company secretary and allowed them to decide whether 
or not the position is required according to their own constitution, public  
companies are still required to make such an appointment.26  This is similar to 
the approach adopted in China and Taiwan,27 who consider that a governance 
officer is necessary for companies who are raising capital from the public. Hence, 
their codes of best practice, which are similar to the UK’s Corporate Governance 
Code, play a more important role than statutory company law. Since private 
companies, and to some extent public companies, do not raise capital from the 
public, corporate governance for them may have a different objective.28 To 
                                                        
22 The Code, as will be recalled, is a soft-law mechanism operating on the basis of ‘comply or 
explain’. 
23 Romilda Mazzotta &  Stefania Veltri ‘The relationship between corporate governance and the 
cost of equity capital. Evidence from the Italian stock exchange’, (2014) 18 Journal of 
Management Governance 419–448; K Chen, Z. Chen, and K Wei ‘Legal protection of investors, 
corporate governance, and the cost of equity capital’ (2009) 15 Journal of Corporate Finance  
273–89. 
24 Regarding one of the causes of the 2007-09 financial meltdown, it has been stated that 
"Sometimes what the directors of financial institutions were being asked to consider was just so 
complicated that a lot of the non-execs didn’t understand what was being suggested, and then it 
became difficult for them to question anything." This was a statement of Lorraine Young, a 
company secretary,  made to the Gateway http://thegatewayonline.com/corporates/types-of-
work/icsa-in-good-company 
In such situations, the company secretary can act as a filter to review the relevant documents and 
determine whether the right types of information have been provided to the directors who, by 
definition, are not involved with the company on a daily basis. 
25 Code of Corporate Governance, Singapore; Code on Corporate Governance Practices, Hong 
Kong.  
26 CA 2006, s 270; If the listed company is a private company, it is required to have a company 
secretary under the CG Code. If it is public company, CA2006 requires a company secretary to be 
appointed. In Singapore, a company secretary is required statutorily under s 171 of the 
Companies Act for both public and private companies.  
27 Shanghai Stock Exchange Listing Rules 2012; Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listing Rules 2012; 
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Best Practice Principles 2016.  
28 The UK’s change in this requirement for private companies was due to the streamlining of 
private companies’ administrative burdens included in the law, resulting in fewer filing and 
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discuss the role of the company secretary in other jurisdictions, especially in 
non-common law countries, and to find common ground for developing codes of 
best governance practice, it is therefore sensible to focus on listed companies. 
Board independence is less of an issue for private companies and non-listed 
public companies; hence, the Corporate Governance Code does not apply to 
private or non-listed public companies because policy compliance to mitigate 
exposure to reputational damage primarily concerns listed companies. 
 
Many private companies do not operate in jurisdictions outside their home 
country through subsidiary operations, so have less concern for subsidiary 
governance.29 Furthermore, what amounts to a private company or a public 
company in non-common law jurisdictions such as China and Taiwan may not be 
comparable to the position in the UK, Singapore, and Hong Kong.  For these 
reasons, the discussion here focuses on how a company secretary brings value to 
listed companies and how that role can be transformed into a corporate 
governance officer. 30 As it happens, company regulators do not develop the rules 
on the role of the company secretary for listed companies in any of the 
jurisdictions discussed here. In the UK, the Financial Reporting Council develops 
the rules, rather than the the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS). In Taiwan, the Securities and Futures Commission promulgates 
the rules on the company secretary rather than the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
In Singapore, it is the Monetary Authority of Singapore rather than the 
Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA). In China, it is the China 
Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) rather than the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC). In Hong Kong, it is the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (SEHK). These regulators focus on listed 
companies, hence common approaches can be more easily adopted.    
 
Section II The Company secretary as an independent gatekeeper 
 
Attribute of independence  
 
If company secretaries are to fulfil the role of corporate governance officer with 
responsibility for the requirement for corporate transparency and facilitating 
board independence, they should retain the critical attribute of independence, as 
do other gatekeepers such as auditors, lawyers, and compliance officers. 
However, this attribute of independence should be regulated in order to best 
realise governance goals. They should be independent when exercising their 
professional judgment, just as lawyers, auditors and other governance 
professionals do. They should be independent in terms of their relationships 
                                                                                                                                                              
reporting requirements for private companies. See David Milman ‘The regulation of private 
companies in UK law: current policy developments and recent judicial rulings’ (2009) 257 
Company Law Newsletter 1-4. 
29 Some private companies are holding companies with subsidiaries operating abroad. However, 
most large multinational companies are public companies. 
30 Private companies can determine in their own constitutions whether to utilise such an office in 
delivering its organisational objectives. According to Companies House statistics, the number of 
companies incorporated without a company secretary since 6 April 2008 has increased greatly.  
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with the companies and members of the board, just as an independent director 
is. 
 
Compliance officer a like in exercising independent judgment  
 
As mentioned, transparency is an indispensable element of modern corporate 
governance, and transparency has been translated into various requirements for 
filing, reporting of law and policy compliance, and timely announcements. 
Company directors and company secretaries, as officers of the company, assume 
filing duties under various laws. These filing, reporting and announcing 
requirements involve independent judgment to be exercised. For instance, 
complying with accounting rules,31 complying with rules specifically designed to 
protect the shareholders ie the pre-emptive rights regime,32 understanding the 
operations of nominee companies to identify rightful investors,33 the application 
of proxy rules to increase shareholder engagement, 34  and the proactive 
development of governance protocol to hedge risks stemming from subsidiary 
operations,35 all demand a skilled governance officer.  In future, companies may 
be required to make disclosures under the freedom of information law if they 
carry out work that is categorised as public service.36 Hence, independent 
judgment would be needed to determine issues concerning disclosure 
requirements.  
 
Furthermore, there are other regulations aiming at removing directors’ conflicts 
of interest and preventing directors’ self-dealing. The duty of enforcing these 
regulations internally falls on the company secretary who shields the company 
from insider misconduct. Under the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000, 37  the company secretary also has a role in implementing and 
communicating procedures for listed company directors to comply with the 
                                                        
31 Company secretaries must ensure that companies’ account records are prepared in the form 
required by company law and accounting standards. Corporate governance structures also affect 
the accounting decisions. See Tamer Elshandidy & Ahmed Hassanein ‘Do IFRS and board of 
directors’ independence affect accounting conservatism?’ (2014)24(16) Applied Financial 
Economics, 1091–1102. 
32 Chapter 3 of CA 2006 on shareholders’ rights on preemption.  
33 For the policy discussion on indirect investors’ enforcement of corporate governance see RC 
Nolan  ‘Indirect Investors: A Greater Say in the Company?’ (2003) 3(1) Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, 73-121. 
34  Tsjalle van der Burg and Aloys Prinz ‘Empowering small shareholders: a comparison of three 
instruments’ (2006)14(5) Corporate Governance 406-417; Paolo Santella, Enrico Baffi, Carlo 
Drago, & Dino Lattuca ‘Legal obstacles to institutional investor activism in the EU and in the US’ 
(2012) vol 23(2) European Business Law Review 257-307.  
35 Geoffrey C. Kiel, Kevin Hendry and Gavin J. Nicholson ‘Corporate governance options for the 
local subsidiaries of multinational enterprises’ (2006) vol 14(6) Corporate Governance 568-579; 
In March 2017, the OECD also released ‘Responsible Business Conduct for Institutional Investors’ 
to help institutional investors implement the due diligence recommendations of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in order to prevent or address adverse impacts related 
to human and labour rights, the environment, and corruption in their investment portfolios. 
36 Simone Mezzacapo  ‘The right of access to public bodies’ records in Italy and UK “Actio Ad 
Exhibendum” and freedom of information risks and opportunities for private sector companies’ 
(2006)17 (4) European Business Law Review 959-979. 
37 S 96B, The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
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Model Code on share dealing. To prevent insider dealing by directors,38 prior 
reporting and obtaining clearance from a non-executive director should pass 
through the company secretary so that a record can be kept of any 
communication.  
 
In some companies, company secretaries act also as a gatekeeper to prevent 
illegal political donations.39 The UK Companies Act 2006 prohibits political 
donations by UK registered companies and subsidiaries of ultimate UK holding 
companies, unless they are authorised by shareholder resolutions in a general 
meeting.40 The company secretary needs to be familiar with the operations of 
subsidiary companies both at home and abroad41 in order to design an effective 
reporting line so that shareholder resolutions can be obtained in a timely 
manner42 and meet disclosure requirements.43 For example, one large multi-
national group requires group companies to return a certificate to the secretary 
of the holding company each year, stating either that no payment has been made 
or providing details when a payment has taken place. The company secretary is 
the ‘go to’ person who oversees reporting duties for subsidiaries. These results 
are then reported annually to the audit committee of the company as well as in 
an interim report to the committee of independent directors.44 This system can 
be implemented either through an internal corporate governance protocol or the 
subsidiary companies’ constitutions.   
 
Chief of staff to the independent chairman  
 
For listed companies, investor confidence is increased by the company 
secretary’s role of enhancing the monitoring and advisory functions of non-
executive directors, in a similar way to the greater independence of directors.45 
To whom a company secretary reports will influence the quality of independence 
of the company secretary. There is no common approach among the jurisdictions 
discussed here. Hong Kong46 and Singapore,47 while largely following the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, are not clear on whether the company secretary 
                                                        
38 S Djankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer ‘The law and economics of self-
dealing’ (2008) Journal of Financial Economics 430–65. 
39 Jack Davies ‘From gentlemanly expectations to regulatory principles: a history of insider 
dealing in the UK: Part 1’ (2015) 36(5) Company Law 132-143. 
40 Richard Williams ‘Regulating political donations by companies: challenges and misconceptions’ 
(2012) 75(6) Modern Law Review 951-980. 
41 Companies Act 2006 Part 14.  A holding company is permitted to seek authorisation of 
donations and expenditure in respect of both the holding company itself and one or more 
subsidiaries through a single approved resolution.  
42 Companies Act 2006 Part 14 s 366. 
43  Under the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
Regulations 2008, Directors’ reports must disclosure any relevant political donations or 
expenditures. SI 2008/410 7 Schs 3,4, and 5.  
44 This is the current practice of the British American Tobacco group. It requires that any 
donation must be authorised by the board of the company. Such a donation must be fully 
documented in the company’s books. 
45 Rafel Crespí-Cladera and Bartolomé Pascual-Fuster ‘Does the independence of independent 
directors matter?’ (2014) 28(1) Journal of Corporate Finance 116-134.  
46 Code on Corporate Governance Practices, Hong Kong. 
47 Code of Corporate Governance, Singapore, Guideline 6.3.  
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acts as chief of staff to the chairman. Neither the Hong Kong nor Singapore code 
makes recommendations for independent non-executive chairmen. China only 
requires the company secretary to be attached to the board. Taiwan does not 
specify whether such an office should be placed under the executive directors or 
the independent directors.  
 
In the UK, the office of the company secretary is often established under the non-
executive chairman’s office - acting as chief of staff to chairman.48 This coincides 
with several oversight functions of the chairman - including the responsibility for 
conducting board evaluation.49 Company secretary’s relational independence, 
when not working under the control of the executive officers, enhances the 
functions of the non-executive directors whose major role is to remove the 
conflicts of interest of the executive directors. Since the auditor or the internal or 
external lawyers do not necessarily attend board meetings and may not have 
direct access to the chairman and other non-executive directors, the company 
secretary has a unique gatekeeping role.  
 
This role has been recognised as long ago as 1993 in the Cadbury Report, which 
recommended that the company secretary should give guidance to the board on 
board members’ responsibilities. Board members should have access to the 
company secretary for such guidance and advice. In particular, the chairman, 
who is responsible for the functioning of the board, should have strong support 
from the company secretary. The company secretary’s attribute of independence 
would not have been as necessary if board meetings were simply a management 
discussion forum without the aim of ensuring that checks and balances are in 
place to support investors’ confidence.  
 
Combining the roles of law and policy compliance, the company secretary is in a 
position to detect insider misconduct through an effective reporting system and 
can ‘whistle-blow’ insider misconduct to the chairman.50  
 
 
Enforcement of independence  
 
A statutory duty or a principle-based approach? 
 
As a gatekeeper and an officer, what kind of duty of independence should a 
company secretary assume? Should he have the duty to exercise independent 
judgment as directors do, and if so, how should the quality of independence be 
maintained? In the jurisdictions discussed, none has imposed a statutory duty to 
exercise independent judgment on company secretaries as they have done on the 
directors.  
                                                        
48 Caroline Newsholme ‘FRC guidance on board effectiveness’ (2011) 35(2) Company Secretary’s 
Review 14-15.  
49 OECD, Corporate Governance Principle VI E4; UK Corporate Governance Code Section B.6.   
50 Indira Carr, David Lewis ‘Combating corruption through employment law and whistleblower 
protection’ (2010) 39(1) Industrial Law Journal 52-52; Peter Yeoh  ‘Whistleblowing: motivations, 
corporate self-regulation, and the law’ (2014) 56(6) International Journal of Law & Management 
459-474. 
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There are practical difficulties in imposing statutory duties of independence on 
company secretaries. As a general duty, UK law requires directors to act 
independently by exercising unfettered judgment. 51  However, company 
secretaries do not take business, management, and executive decisions in the 
way that company directors do. They act, as recommended in some codes of 
governance,52 under the direction of the chairman. It is difficult to define the 
boundary between exercising independent judgment and acting under the 
direction of the chairman.  
 
Whether such a duty should be legally imposed on company secretaries depends 
on their functions vis-à-vis the board (whether they also take executive 
decisions), the organizational objectives (what kind of responsibilities are 
delegated to them), and corporate governance agenda (whether they have the 
task to manage a group’s compliance programme). The company secretary may 
act as chief of staff to the non-executive chairman, an adviser to the board, a 
critical appraiser of board members’ roles, a third person in a chairman-CEO 
relationship, an interface between the board and the shareholders, a gatekeeper 
for corporate governance. If these roles are to remain open for organizational 
innovation, the duty of independence does not need to be legally prescribed. This 
approach would allow companies to design the job descriptions freely without 
being caught out unnecessarily by strict legal rules.53  
 
Hence, a code of conduct with a situational approach to the meaning of 
‘independence’ – using the negative criteria as the Corporate Governance Code 
2016 does for independent directors - can be issued for defining relational 
independence.54 In addition, there can be systems and processes to ensure the 
quality of independence, notably, on the appointment to, and removal from 
office.55 For the requirement to exercise independent judgment, the professional 
code can provide guidance as the case for laywers and auditors.56   
 
Appointment and removal  
 
If the company secretary is expected to be a corporate gatekeeper in a similar 
way as an auditor, the appointment and removal of an auditor could offer an 
equivalent way of proceeding. Thus, since an individual director cannot 
unilaterally dismiss an appointed auditor, an individual director should also not 
                                                        
51 CA 06 s 173. 
52 The UK Corporate Governance Code and Singapore Code of Corporate Governance. 
53 Principles-based regulation can be considered. See Julia Black, Martyn Hopper & Christa Band 
‘Making a success of Principles-based regulation’ (2007) 1(3) Law and Financial Markets Review 
191-206. 
54 The Code of Corporate Governance uses the same situational approach to define when a non-
executive director is not independent.   
55 Some lessons can be learnt from auditor’s appointment and removal to maintain audit 
independence. See Reiner Quick ‘EC Green Paper proposals and audit quality’ (2012) 9(1) 
Accounting in Europe 17-38. 
56 See auditor’s independence in APB Ethical Standard 1 (revised) on integrity, objectivity, and 
independence (2008), http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/ES1%20-
%20v5%20clean.pdf. 
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be able to remove a company secretary, leaving only the board with the power of 
appointment or removal. As the law places greater control on the appointment 
and removal of a company’s auditor for greater investor confidence, auditor 
rotation, the control of auditors’ remuneration, control procedures for limiting 
auditors’ liabilities to the company, and shareholder participation in 
appointment and removal processes all help to ensure auditor independence. 
Although there is no hard law in the UK with the effect of regulating a company 
secretary’s independence, the UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that 
only the board should have the ability to appoint and remove a company 
secretary; an individual director should not be able to do so unilaterally.57 This is 
also the approach adopted in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and China except 
that there is no clear indication of whether an individual director, acting with 
delegated powers from the board, can unilaterally dismiss the company 
secretary. Taiwan further specifies that the nomination committee should 
participate in the appointment of the company secretary. 
 
Shareholder approval 
 
Should the shareholders have a say on the appointment and dismissal of their 
governance officer? A company secretary can be a permanent employee of a 
company, unlike an auditor (a contractor) or a company director of a listed 
company, whose term of office is usually based on a service contract of some 
limited period. Subjecting company secretaries to similar controls could disrupt 
the administrative operation of companies, including the strict filing and 
reporting duties required by the law. If the removal and appointment of a 
company secretary requires shareholder approval at a general meeting,58 the 
board will be unable to quickly suspend a company secretary who is found to be 
in default of compliance with the law or of his or her contractual or other duties 
to the company. In an interim period, such a company may need to fulfil its filing 
duties urgently, and convening a meeting to obtain approval of the company’s 
shareholders can cause missed filing deadlines, with a consequent contravention 
of the law for which directors would be liable.59   
 
Some lessons may be learnt from the auditor’s model for regulating the 
independence of the company secretary. Auditors have the right to make 
representations to the shareholders who vote on the question of their removal.60 
A similar arrangement could be set up for the removal of a company secretary. 
Prior to the authorisation of their removal, they should be able to make a written 
or oral representation to the board. Since their removal is not by ordinary 
resolution, a representation to the general meeting may not be justified. 
However, a representation to be included in the company’s annual can be 
required by the Corporate Governance Code. This will make the removal process 
more transparent.  
 
                                                        
57 UK Corporate Governance Code B.5.2. 
58 This is currently required for a removal of the auditor.  
59 CA 2006 s 541.  
60 CA 2006 s 511(3) 
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Using a soft law approach to regulating the role of company secretary with the 
emphasis on disclosing company policy as well as setting up formal procedures 
for appointment and removal would allow independence to be enhanced within 
the board and the company.    
 
Section III The prospects and legal challenges of provisional services firms  
 
Justification for outside professional services firms to act 
 
It is debatable whether a permanent employee (an internal officer) or a 
contracted professional firm (an external contractor) would better fulfil the role 
of gatekeeper. An employee company secretary is closer and more integrated 
into the board and the company than an external consultant. He has closer 
proximity to the shareholders, hence is in a better position to act as 
spokesperson for the board in communicating with shareholders. An employee 
company secretary may hold a longer tenure than executive directors and, 
having experienced both good and bad times, is also a better repository of 
corporate memory which is invaluable for providing guidance to a board. 61  
 
On the other hand, an external person may be more independent from the 
management and can take a more objective view. In fact, many corporate 
gatekeeping functions are now being taken up by outside professional firms as 
contractors who can provide company secretarial services. Some listed 
companies have long been using professional services firms to fulfil their 
statutory requirements. This includes the appointment of professional services 
firms to act as company secretary, outsourcing some part of the work to the 
firms, or retaining them as back-up support.62 This is also the case for the 
countries discussed here, except Taiwan and China.  
 
Unlike Singapore, China, and Taiwan, UK law does not require a company 
secretary be a full-time employee or an individual person.63 A body corporate 
providing secretarial services can be appointed as the company secretary. The 
benefit of having a corporate company secretary is that it provides flexibility by 
enabling more than one person to represent the company and also gives access 
to a more extensive knowledge base. Similarly, a professional firm in the form of 
a partnership or limited liability partnership (LLP) can also provide such 
services. Professional services firms can have greater expertise and knowledge 
in particular areas of governance, such as the listing and compliance 
requirements for stock exchanges. A company does not need to employ a full-
time person to hold the office and can contract the service out to a professional 
firm to be more cost-effective. If a company needs specialised knowledge - in 
financial law, for example - a law firm can provide the service. A lawyer can be 
retained by a company to hold the office of company secretary.  Such retainers 
are generally welcomed by law firms because they allow the law firms to become 
                                                        
61 The Company Secretary: Building trust through governance, 2014 ICSA  
https://www.icsa.org.uk/products-and-services/knowledge-and-guidance/research/the-
company-secretary-report 
62 This is the case especially at times of peak company secretarial activity e.g. year-end/AGM.  
63 Hong Kong also allows a body corporate to act as a company secretary.  
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familiar with the company and to forge a good business relationship with it.64 In 
such cases, the company is free to design its own job description, and the 
professional services firm can provide tailor-made secretarial services. Market 
competition between firms allows companies to obtain cost-effective secretarial 
services.65 
 
Questions of independence and liability  
 
Two major issues arise. As with audit firms, market competition, a driver 
thought to deliver innovation, can compromise the element of independence that 
is critical for the gatekeeping service.66 The company secretary’s independence is 
fundamental to corporate value creation. However, how can secretarial quality 
be maintained and enhanced in this respect if the provision of the service is 
subject to market competition? And also, how should a company secretary’s acts 
and liability be attributed? Does the liability rest with the company or the firm 
that provides the service, whether a company, an ordinary, or limited liability 
partnership? Professional services firms, which potentially hold assets, 67 are 
more likely to become a source of compensation than an individual employee 
with limited assets. Since April 2005,68 UK companies can now freely provide 
indemnities to a secretary as they see fit. If this can apply to professional services 
firms, controls should be established to ensure that service quality is not unduly 
compromised.  
 
Maintaining the attribute of independence  
 
Low-balling issue and disclosure  
 
Many professional services firms provide a large range of corporate services to 
companies including audit, management, tax, secretarial and legal services. The 
issue of auditor independence has been raised when an auditor, acting as an 
external gatekeeper, plays ‘low ball’ to gain other non-audit businesses.69 Such 
market competition is essential to service innovation, but it can also compromise 
some of the key requirements for maintaining good corporate governance and 
creating corporate value. When an independent audit is compromised, market 
competition fails to deliver value, not only as an engine for innovation but also as 
an alternative regulatory tool for quality control. None of the countries 
                                                        
64 Such a secondment arrangement can provide mutual benefits. See Secondment plan of mutual 
benefit (1992) 6(47) Lawyer 6. 
65 Christopher Humphrey ‘Regulating audit beyond the crisis: A critical discussion of the EU 
Green Paper’ (2011) 20(3) The European Accounting Review 431-457. 
66 K Houghton and C Jubb ‘The Market for financial report audits: Regulation of and competition 
for auditor independence’ (2003) 25(3) Law and Policy 299-321. 
67 Companies can provide indemnities to corporate officers i.e. company directors. The auditor 
can also enter into a damage limitation agreement with the audited company to control their 
financial if not reputational exposure.  
68 The Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004.  
69 Patrick Velte and Carl-Christian Freidank, ‘The link between in- and external rotation of the 
auditor and the quality of financial accounting and external audit’ (2015)40(3) European Journal 
of Law and Economics 225-246. 
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investigated here have provided solutions, specifically in the context of the 
company secretary.  
 
There are many ways to regulate conflicts of interest when a professional 
services firm is engaged to provide secretarial services. Company secretarial and 
other management consulting services are more likely to be among the 
additional business that can be gained from audit ‘low-balling’ practices. The 
issue is how to make sure that the secretarial services offered are not ‘tagged 
along’ with the audit service. Potential conflicts can be controlled by the 
company disclosing such a ‘tag-along’ relationship. Once the tag-along 
relationship has been disclosed, shareholder approval should be required to 
further examine potential conflicts and the value provided to the company. Such 
approval may only be needed for services provided by the professional services 
firms who offer a full range of services. Furthermore, compulsory rotation, if 
introduced, would be able to maintain a more arms-length relationship between 
the company and professional services firms. Rotation can also increase 
independence since the company secretary will be less attached to the 
management team, hence fostering a more arms-length relationship. In addition, 
UK whistle-blower protection law also applies to contractors. 70 This law further 
strengthens professional services firms’ ability to maintain the quality of 
independence. 
 
Competing clients and a Chinese-wall  
 
There is a further issue regarding a service firm’s liability for conflicts of interest. 
If, as discussed in the previous section, company secretaries are contracted to 
provide value-added services such as the appointment of non-executive 
directors, designing a cost-effective reporting system or a compliance 
monitoring programme, a professional services firm providing the same 
secretarial services to competing companies at the same time may give rise to a 
claim for a conflict of interest. This is because the firms will have access to 
sensitive commercial information when they attend board meetings and can 
access information about subsidiaries through the governance protocol or by 
virtue of the subsidiary’s constitution.71 For a partnership firm, an internal wall 
created to absolve potential conflicts may be needed. Such a ‘Chinese wall’ may 
be more effective for managing the risk of conflicts between, say, the audit and 
secretarial departments. Whether such a wall can also be effective when raised 
within the secretarial department is questionable. Would disclosure of the 
conflicts by the firm and client consent be sufficient to remove the liability? 
Disclosure by the firm and client consent may remove the conflicts if the 
secretarial service is purely administrative, but if the work includes more 
business-oriented services, for instance involvement in the recruitment of non-
executive directors, such conflicts are not easily removed. When a law firm is 
retained to act as company secretary and is tasked with monitoring a corporate 
compliance programme, this may create a conflict if the firm is also retained by a 
competing company. 
                                                        
70 In the US, whistleblower protection is not given to at-will employees.  
71 Ben Walther ‘Bylaw governance’ (2014) 20 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 
399- 459. 
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The UK is the only country, amongst the discussed jurisdictions, that has dealt 
with this problem to some extent. Under section 1214(2) of the Companies Act 
2006, the auditor of a company cannot also be the company secretary. But this 
does not completely solve the potential for conflicts of interest. If a company 
appoints an auditor from a particular services firm, this would not prevent 
another person from the same services firm from acting as company secretary.  
 
Attribution of professional firms’ liabilities  
 
Clarifying firms’ potential liabilities is crucial for assessing the risk to the 
governance service industry. Since the company secretary is considered to be an 
officer of the company in all the jurisdictions investigated here, how can their 
liabilities be attributable to the firms? None of the jurisdictions investigated have 
a satisfactory model, even for the UK’s more advanced service industry. Other 
than the UK and Hong Kong, all the jurisdictions require the company secretary 
to be an individual person. The UK and Hong Kong are the only two jurisdictions 
that allow a body corporate to act. This has raised a number of legal 
uncertainties which have inhibited other countries from following suit.  
 
The UK Companies Act 2006 imposes criminal liabilities on the company 
secretary,72 therefore not having a clear approach to identifying the person to be 
held accountable would defeat the deterrent effect of the criminal sanctions. For 
civil liability, identifying the right accountable person affects the remedies to be 
awarded to injured parties.  
 
 
Criminal liability  
 
Secretarial services can be provided by a professional firm, which can be a body 
corporate (including a limited liability partnership73) or a partnership. The law 
states that it is possible for an officer of the company to be held civilly and 
criminally liable. When a company engages a partnership firm (i.e. an LLP - a 
separate legal entity from its members) to provide services, who is the person, in 
fact and in law, appointed to hold the office of company secretary?  
 
In the UK, a body corporate can be made criminally liable. 74 Yet, there is some 
confusion in the wording of the provisions under the Companies Act 2006. The 
Act provides that when a person is an officer of another company, he or she does 
not commit an offence as an officer in default unless one of the company’s 
officers is in default. The provision can be taken to mean that the company 
providing the secretarial services, by holding the office of company secretary, 
cannot be held criminally liable under the Act unless a director of the 
professional services firm is identified as an officer in default by authorising, 
permitting, participating in, or failing to take all reasonable steps to prevent the 
contravention. Nevertheless, a director of a professional services firm may not be 
                                                        
72 For instance, CA 2006, s 26(3), s 32(3), s 425, s 451, and Part 36 (Offences under the 
Companies Acts).  
73 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 s1(2). 
74 Criminal Justice Act 1993 s 52 and Enterprise Act 2002 s 188. 
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personally involved in the provision of the service, and in that case the director’s 
firm will not be held criminally liable. The current provisions of the Act can make 
the application of the attribution rules confusing.  
When the services firm is a partnership or limited liability partnership, an 
individual member of that firm will serve as the company secretary and thus, 
criminal liability is assumed by that individual rather than the firm. However, 
because a limited liability partnership acquires a separate legal identity, if the 
company engages the services firm rather than an individual from the firm, a 
similar question can arise. Neither the Act and nor case law have yet considered 
such a situation. A clear legal framework on attributing individual behaviour or 
liability to the entity (or association) of the professional services firms should be 
introduced.  
Civil liability  
In terms of civil liability, the company or its shareholders75  through a derivative 
claim can pursue compensation claims or a claim to account for profits against 
the firm and/or the individual from the firm providing the service. Assuming the 
professional services firm is a body corporate such as a company, claims can be 
made against the company. If the firm is an entity other than a company, claims 
in contract or in tort brought to obtain compensation will depend on the 
organisational form of the firm – whether the individual is liable or all the 
members of the partnership could be claimed against. If an LLP is retained to act 
as the company secretary, the contract is between the company and the LLP, 
which is a body corporate under UK law. An action for damages should be 
brought against the LLP. There can be an indemnity provision in the contract.  
Yet, an action in tort can be brought against the individual person providing the 
service.  
Since other countries use different business forms for professional services 
firms, it may not be easy for develop a common model among them. This also 
explains why other countries, apart from the UK, have capacity (natural person 
only) and residence requirements. These requirements remove the risks of being 
unable to hold an individual accountable and not being able to make claims 
against firms with limited liability protection.  
Section IV Transnational governance and combination with the office of 
general counsel  
Transnational governance and the resulting synergies  
There are a number of jurisdictions that require companies to appoint a 
company secretary.76  As multinational companies are becoming the main 
                                                        
75 CA 2006 Part II. 
76 Ireland, Australia (only for public companies), New Zealand, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
China and USA (ie State of Delaware under s 142(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law). 
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providers of goods and services, the company secretaries’ tasks are to design an 
effective subsidiary governance framework to mitigate harms and to create 
governance synergies. These synergies can be delivered in the case of actual or 
potential joint law enforcement actions against multinational companies. In 
actual joint law enforcement, company secretaries are the first contact point for 
responding to regulatory and enforcement enquiries across many jurisdictions. 
In potential joint law enforcement actions, their role is to ensure that measures,  
such as a subsidiary governance framework, 77  are in place to prevent 
enforcement actions or to defer an enforcement action in the case of a deferred 
enforcement action agreement.78  
General counsel and company secretary  
Within a multinational company, if the general counsel also serves as company 
secretary, the legal office can be organised to include the company secretaries of 
subsidiaries incorporated in different jurisdictions. Many UK companies have 
combined the offices of company secretary and corporate counsel.79 Of the FTSE 
100 companies surveyed in a census,80 70.2% of the company secretaries held a 
legal qualification.81 Under a subsidiary governance framework, the subsidiary 
company secretaries can provide needed information (e.g. a certificate of 
political donations) to the general counsel of the parent company and can assist 
the general counsel with implementing procedures as required by law (e.g. an 
anti-bribery programme) for the subsidiary companies. A governance structure 
designed to allow the company secretary of the parent company to supervise, 
through a reporting line, subsidiary companies’ secretaries can effectively 
ensure improved information-sharing across the group organisation.  
In increasing joint enforcement by multi-jurisdictional enforcement agencies, a 
global settlement agreement with a reform programme would be a cost-saving 
strategy for a defaulting company. This combination of the two offices would 
make it easier for monitored parent companies to conduct due diligence on other 
group affiliates.82  However, a general counsel or a legal officer is not required in 
the UK and in many other jurisdictions, yet many large companies and 
multinational companies have general counsel offices or legal departments that 
manage the company’s legal affairs. If a general counsel or legal officer is not a 
legally required officer within the organisation, this person may not have legal 
access to, or the power to obtain corporate information. Legally, the general 
                                                        
77 Federico Mazzacuva ‘Justifications and Purposes of Negotiated Justice for Corporate Offenders: 
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements in the UK and US Systems of Criminal Justice’ (2014) 
78 (3) Journal of Criminal Law 249-262. 
78 The company secretary can also be the designated person to monitor a deferred statement 
programme.   
79 Ian Maurice of Egon Zehnder discusses the relationship between General Counsel and 
Company Secretary and describes the UK trend to split these roles 
http://www.egonzehnder.com/files/the_general_counsel_and_the_board.pdf 
80 The census was carried out in 2004 by Equiniti.  
81 Only legally qualified lawyer in Taiwan can serve as a company secretary.  
82 Deborah DeMott ‘The Crucial But (potentially) precarious position of the chief compliance 
officer’ (2013) 8 Brookings Journal of Corporate Finance and Compliance Law 57-70. 
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counsel does not have access to the boardroom, but such access can be gained 
through becoming the company secretary. Thus, the general counsel may request 
information from a subsidiary company’s in-house counsel who does not have 
the legal power to access the company’s information. However, a company 
secretary who is an officer of the company would have such power, and 
obtaining corporate information such as records or sales data would not need to 
be authorised by the executive directors - to whom the general counsel is 
affiliated.  
UK companies are required to implement internal procedures under various acts 
to protect the stakeholders of the company and safeguard the interests of the 
general public. Companies are required to put in place health and safety 
procedures to protect employees and to implement an anti-corruption system 
within the organisation, including subsidiary companies incorporated in other 
jurisdictions. Company secretaries involved in the design and implementation of 
these procedures who work collaboratively with other company secretaries of 
the same group under, say, the general counsel’s office, would ensure that the 
norms of the parent company are effectively diffused through the subsidiary 
companies. These norms can also result in a spillover effect on the business 
environment surrounding the subsidiary companies. These procedural 
mechanisms not only create a safe harbour if there is misconduct by an 
employee or an agent of the company and its subsidiaries, but they may be 
required by regulators as a condition for a deferred prosecution.83 Since some of 
the countries investigated here require the company secretary to operate under 
the chairman, it is questionable whether the office of a parent company’s 
secretary can give direct instructions to the company secretaries of their 
subsidiary companies.  
The problem of wearing two hats  
When a person serves as both general counsel and company secretary of a single 
company, it is difficult to make a precise distinction between the functions and 
roles of the two posts. The law requires a company to appoint a secretary, but it 
does not require a general counsel. Yet a general counsel acts as an independent 
legal adviser to a company, and legal advice given to the company receives 
privileged protection against disclosure.84 A company secretary, however, is an 
officer of the company rather than an independent legal adviser and any advice 
given, even if legal, is not protected by the legal privilege rules. Legal privilege 
rules confer protection on companies against the disclosure of internal 
communications which would otherwise be required by third parties. A company 
secretary may have a duty to report to the regulator and may have to make a 
public interest disclosure of misconduct by the company, or an insider of the 
company, to the regulator while receiving protection.85 Yet, the general counsel 
                                                        
83 Jessica Naima Dijlani ‘The British importation of American corporate compliance’ (2011) 76 
Brookings Law Review 303- 341. 
84 Three Rivers District Council -v- Bank of England (No. 5) [2003] QB 1556 and Three Rivers 
District Council -v- The Bank of England (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610. 
85 The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. 
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does not have such a duty and may not make a public interest disclosure. So it is 
understandable why a general counsel may be appointed to hold the office of 
company secretary, even if not all of the advice given to the board or individual 
officers of the company in internal communications can be classified as legal 
advice. There is clearly an advantage for companies to appoint a legally qualified 
person to act as company secretary and, indeed, Taiwan requires that only 
qualified lawyers in Taiwan can act as a company secretary. Thus the office can 
be easily assumed by general counsel of the company. This, however, excludes 
other governance professionals such as auditors who can provide different set of 
governance skills to the companies.  
Communication privilege against disclosure given to the company 
secretary  
Communication privilege against disclosure should be given to a company 
secretary who is not a legally qualified person in the UK in order to level the 
playing field. In other jurisdictions, this protection can also encourage a board to 
communicate with its corporate governance officer.  
The corporate governance codes of the UK, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan all 
specify that a company secretary should be accessible to board members for 
advice.86 If so, would advice given to individual non-executive directors on their 
rights and duties constitute legal advice? Such protection may encourage non-
executive directors to seek the advice of general counsel or outside counsel on an 
issue. Based on such advice, non-executive directors can make legally informed 
decisions. Without such legal privilege protection, members of the board would 
not only be less willing to use the company secretary for internal governance 
advice but also less willing to share information with them.  
Should privilege protection cover internal communications between a company 
secretary who is not legally qualified and the company, or the individual 
directors, in order to enhance corporate value? In all the work carried out by the 
company secretary of a listed company, they must put on legal spectacles87 when 
providing their service; be it formulating governance protocols and instituting 
reporting systems to improve governance standards or evaluating governance 
strategies and best practice. They also act as a liaison between the board and 
management. Without such protection, officers may be discouraged from seeking 
advice from a non-lawyer company secretary. If such a company secretary is not 
used by other officers for internal advice this would reduce the company 
secretary’s ability to give advice on governance issues. In particular, if the 
company secretary acts as chief of staff to the chairman and also as the executive 
and non-executive directors’ link to the chairman, protection given to their 
communications would enhance greater information-sharing at that level. Such 
protection would level the playing-field for a company secretary without legal 
                                                        
86 Corporate Governance Code, B 5.2. 
87  This is the test that Lord Roger developed in Three Rivers District Council -v- The Bank of 
England (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610. 
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qualifications who can provide an enhanced level of governance compared with 
a general counsel who is normally attached to the CEO’s office. 
Conclusion  
Many common law and non-common law countries have recognised the 
governance value of a company secretary playing the role of corporate 
governance officer in listed companies. This paper has shown that soft-law based 
corporate governance has the potential to enhance the gatekeeping functions of 
the company secretary in facilitating corporate transparency through law and 
policy compliance. It may also enhance board independence through assisting 
oversight by non-executive directors. The attribute of independence of a 
company secretary- both independnece in terms of judgment and in terms of his 
reltionships with the company and members of the board, can benefit from a 
soft-law approach to regulation.  Professional codes of conduct can be developed 
to provide situational guidance on independence. Corporate governance codes 
can include a regime on the appointment and removal of a company secretary – 
including the right of representation to the board of a removed company 
secretary, and on conflicts of interest that may arise when appointing a 
professional services firm as company secretary. More definite rules on 
corporate attribution in civil and criminal liabilities should be introduced to 
increase the utility of professional services firms in the provision of such a 
gatekeeping service. The UK, as the leading governance services providing 
country, has the potential to provide guidance. However, some amendment to 
the current provisions in the Companies Act 2006 should be made to avoid a 
confusing reading. At the transnational level, there can be governance synergies 
in creating joint subsidiary governance frameworks. Although company 
secretaries may yield synergies in providing coordinated responses to joint 
enforcement actions at a cross-border level, a non-legally qualified secretary can 
also bring a different set of skills to companies in assisting the governance 
programme. Giving protection to communications between the company 
secretary and board members can increase the ability of the company secretary 
to give guidance in matters of governance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
